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Theme1: Fiscal governance in the Euro-zone is fatally flawed and it would be preferable 
to have a more integrated framework based on permanent institutions rather than rules. 
 
 
Summary: The fiscal governance of the Euro-area is subject to debate and this paper 
aims to it identify key insights and propose potential solutions. It first describes the 
theoretical rationale for fiscal discipline, then turns to a brief description of the evolution of 
the EMU’s fiscal institutional framework and afterwards assesses the debate as well as 
current reform proposals. The upshot of the analysis is that, as some authors have 
suggested, fiscal governance based on compulsory and automatic rules is unlikely either 
to lead to sound fiscal policy or to be enforceable in an intergovernmental setting. 
Therefore a more integrated framework based on permanent institutions rather than rules 
is proposed and briefly sketched. 
 
 
Analysis: The main idea behind the design of the EMU was that having a single 
monetary policy was perfectly compatible with preserving a plurality of economic 
sovereignties. While the interest rate was centrally fixed in Frankfurt, there was no need 
for a similar degree of integration in other areas. Financial regulation was managed 
according to the subsidiarity principle, and growth policies (structural reform) and fiscal 
policy could be handled in a decentralised, intergovernmental fashion. 
 
The advent of the crisis has questioned the soundness of this arrangement. Although 
European countries live in an ‘ever closer union’, have very interdependent economies 
and integrated financial systems, the response to the early crisis appeared to be largely 
insufficient and uncoordinated. Governments proved to be unable to coordinate 
themselves in a single fiscal stimulus and one could even perceive a real risk of 
protectionist measures that would endanger the sacrosanct principle of the free 
movement of goods in the EU. 
 
In retrospect, the real problem does not appear to be the uncoordinated character of the 
response, but the previous incapacity to prevent fiscal and current account imbalances. 
There is therefore clearly a case for examining the institutional framework in order to 
identify potential improvements in the current framework. 
 
The goal of this paper is to revisit the debate about the fiscal governance of the Eurozone 
with the aim of identifying key insights and potential solutions. Since the subject is vast, it 
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will concentrate on the issue of fiscal imbalances. The paper is structured as follows: after 
presenting the possible justification for fiscal discipline in a monetary union and –briefly– 
how the policy framework has evolved, it then evaluates how the current framework could 
be repaired. It assesses current proposals and argues that the approach based on 
automatic rules and sanctions is likely to fail. It therefore suggests that the way forward for 
fiscal policy could be to abandon rigid rules and instead adopt flexible institutions, as 
occurred in the past with monetary policy. 
 
Possible Rationales for Constraints on National Fiscal Policies 
There are mainly two rationales for setting some minimum constraints on national fiscal 
policies. The first one is from the field of political economy and is based on the idea that 
since national governments are prone to fiscal misbehaviour –that is, accumulating too 
much debt– there is therefore much to be gained from a set of rules or institutions that put 
a constraint on fiscal action. This might happen due to weak or decentralised 
governments being unable to strike a deal of fiscal consolidation, or to voters who suffer 
from some form of fiscal illusion and fail to punish a government with a lax fiscal stance. In 
this context, the EU framework can be a useful commitment device to lead to sound policy 
to correct government failures. 
 
The second argument stresses the fact that fiscal discipline is an essential complement of 
a price-stability-oriented monetary policy. Although at first sight fiscal and monetary policy 
can seem to be separate and independent, this is only true as an institutional or legal 
construct. But, as a matter of fact –and as the current crisis has made clear–, fiscal and 
monetary policy have always been linked, since the monopoly that central banks have on 
issuing money is a source of revenue for the government. 
 
In a monetary union, the costs of a bailout in the event of default –higher inflation– would 
be inevitably shared by all its members, but the benefits of irresponsible fiscal behaviour 
would only be enjoyed by one state. This justifies treating fiscal policy as a common 
problem. But although this is sufficient to justify a no-bail-out clause, it is difficult to see 
why more stringent measures are needed. The problem is that as states are big economic 
players, they are likely to be considered ‘too big to fail’ and therefore bail-out clauses are 
unlikely to be credible. 
 
The SGP, its Critics and Evolution 
Although these concerns might look like ex post facto rationales, they were already in the 
mind of the drafters of the Maastricht treaty, especially the German authorities. The fiscal 
framework that saw the birth of the euro can be briefly described as follows: (1) monetary 
policy was strictly separated from fiscal policy, first by a ‘no-bail-out clause’ written into the 
treaty and, secondly, by a strongly independent central bank, although the possibility of a 
sovereign default and the need for a mechanism to deal with it was not, however, even 
envisioned; and (2) a set of rules was designed to ensure sound fiscal behaviour, the 
most prominent of which was the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
 
The SGP consisted originally of two regulations with force of law that clarified the meaning 
of the Maastricht treaty provisions regarding excessive deficits. The arrangement had 
three arms: (1) the preventive arm, which was a system of multilateral surveillance in 
which member states submitted reports on their public finances to the ECOFIN scrutiny; 
(2) the corrective arm, which defined more clearly what was supposed to be considered a 
temporary deficit; and (3) the dissuasive arm, which established some rules for sanctions 
 2
Area: International Economy & Trade 
ARI 65/2011 
Date: 12/4/2011 
 
 
 
 
 
under the usual European arrangement, by which the Commission proposes while the 
ECOFIN rules. 
 
The fiscal framework was harshly criticised by, arguably, a majority of the academic 
community. Summarising, the main critique suggested that the 3% ceiling was too 
automatic and largely inadequate since it was a bad proxy for sound fiscal policy. For 
example, if the debt to GDP ratio is to remain stable –in order to ensure fiscal 
sustainability– then the deficit should be, on average, roughly equal to the growth rate of 
the country –which differs from country to country–. But the SGP ignored this sort of 
consideration. Moreover, the SGP ignored many other factors, such as public investment, 
which should be treated separately, or ‘implicit liabilities’, such as pensions or health care 
expenditures, that are a large part of future expenditures. Additionally, the pact not only 
punished member states for their deficits, but failed to reward them for good fiscal 
behaviour in good times. Finally, the pact was criticised because it gave governments 
incentives to focus on the wrong objective: fiscal consolidation instead of structural, 
growth-enhancing reforms. 
 
Overall, the consensus suggested that there was a need for a more comprehensive and 
flexible approach to fiscal discipline. This consensus permeated the reform of the pact 
when, in 2002, several member states breached it and the ECOFIN decided to suspend it 
instead of sanctioning deviators. The reform approved in 2005 by the European Council 
adopted a more flexible approach, abandoning the one-size-fits-all policy, taking more into 
account the importance of national differences and also the effort put into reforming their 
productive models. The idea was that if countries could ensure high growth rates after 
structural reform, then the ratio of debt to GDP would fall. 
 
In retrospect this approach can be regarded as a failure. Many apparently healthy public 
finances according to debt and deficit measures actually were not. Structural reform was 
no better enforced after the pact was made more flexible, but arguably the opposite 
happened. Moreover, many threats that materialised ex post, such as sovereign 
insolvency, were not even taken into account. Therefore, a new approach becomes 
necessary. 
 
The failure of the SGP was recognised by member states when the fiscal crisis became 
evident and therefore a reform was suggested. The European Commission drafted a 
proposal during the last month of 2010. In its proposal, countries could be put under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure when their general government gross debt was greater than 
60% of GDP and not declining ‘satisfactorily’. Moreover, countries could be penalised 
when their structural deficit –that is, once corrected for the cycle effect– ‘deviates 
significantly from the adjustment path foreseen in the SGP’. Additionally, the procedure of 
mutual surveillance would be strengthened by the proposal to create a ‘European 
semester’ during the first six months of each year, where monitoring of national policies 
would be intensified and member states would be required to present their national 
Stability and Convergence programmes. Finally, it reformed the implementation 
mechanism: sanctions would be automatically imposed but a qualified majority of the 
council could reject them. 
 
The Pact reached by the European Council of March 2011 essentially builds on this 
approach. Fiscal consolidation is coupled with the importance of structural reform. The 
initial one-size-fits-all 3% limit is now completely relinquished and only taken as part of a 
large set of indicators. These indicators include both implicit and explicit liabilities, taking 
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into account healthcare, pension liabilities and demographic factors. The main innovation 
is perhaps the reform of the enforcement mechanism. Individual countries commit to 
reform national fiscal institutions by translating the SGP into national legislation, which 
must take the form of ‘hard law’ –such as a constitutional clause or a framework law–. 
Although the details of the reform should be spelled out by individual countries, the Pact 
explicitly mentions the importance of subnational levels of governments. All in all, 
however, the essence of the enforcement mechanism has not changed: governance 
remains an intergovernmental affair. Although sanctions are mentioned, the main forces 
that ensure compliance are the political mechanisms of peer pressure and ‘naming and 
shaming’. 
 
An Assessment of the Debate 
There are, broadly speaking, two interrelated reasons why the former approach failed to 
achieve its objective. First, the fact that the targets it assigned to individual countries were 
badly designed and undermined the pact’s legitimacy. Fiscal consolidations are frequently 
painful from a political point of view. Although politicians might often pursue policies that 
are painful but are considered necessary, the incentive to sacrifice their political capital in 
such a task may be much lower when the goal is considered inappropriate. Hence, this 
might explain why the former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi 
called the pact ‘stupid’. Moreover, as shown by the current crisis, many countries that 
performed well under the criteria of the SGP –such as Ireland and Spain– hid a far less 
bright situation, that might have been captured by a broader set of indicators. 
 
But, more generally, the main reason why the pact failed was arguably that it lacked any 
credible enforcement mechanism. Negotiations in the ECOFIN to impose sanctions were 
likely to be politically motivated –and therefore results reflected the relative political 
strength of individual member states–; hence, large member states were unlikely to 
respect it. More importantly, the pact’s framework lacked any sort of enforcement 
mechanism to compel a country that was reluctant to do so. Such a mechanism would 
have been regarded as too intrusive in internal political affairs, but it appears, at least in 
retrospect, to have been necessary. 
 
The underlying philosophy of the initial pact was that fiscal behaviour could only be 
enforced by political compromise and symbolic measures such as sanctions. The 
‘sanctions constraint’ was never credible, as the pact was breached on many occasions 
and sanctions were never imposed. Moreover, intergovernmental methods of enforcement 
are both unfair and ineffective. While small countries had a lot to lose from international 
political shaming, large countries knew that their bargaining power was much greater; this 
resulted in an unfair asymmetric enforcement with the collateral effect of being a constant 
source of tension between member states. 
 
From this perspective, the assessment of the current proposal for reform is mixed. On the 
one hand, it is clear that the reform goes in the right direction. The critique of the 
arbitrariness of the 3% has been largely overcome and the pact now includes a larger set 
of indicators, focusing on what really matters: debt sustainability. The enforcement 
mechanism has also been strengthened, giving more power to the European 
Commission, augmenting the automaticity of sanctions and giving more weight to national 
institutions. On the other hand, progress is insufficient and there are several risks still 
present. 
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Any credible reform of the SGP will face a trade-off between independence and 
automaticity. The idea is as follows. In retrospect, the main problem of the SGP’s 
enforcement mechanism was that it was operated by the same states who were supposed 
to be penalised. The mechanism encouraged collusion between states and bullying of 
smaller states by larger ones. The initial arrangement that was supposed to resolve the 
problem was to make the pact automatic: to rely as little as possible on the judgment of 
member states. 
 
If this approach was to lead to sound fiscal policy, it would consist of a full specification of 
all contingencies that would make the pact perfectly enforceable, allowing for automatic 
enforcement while avoiding the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. However, this kind of complete 
drafting is for obvious reasons not possible. Therefore, the pact led to bad fiscal policy. 
The reforms that followed tried to solve the problem by relying on a more flexible and 
discretionary approach. However, flexibility always means that measures are likely to be 
disputable and easy to manipulate for political reasons. While the 3% threshold is hard to 
manipulate, an assessment of sustainability relies to a much greater extent on subjective 
judgment. 
 
An additional disadvantage of a rule-based approach is that it might, paradoxically, relax 
discipline. Hagen2 suggests that one of the risks of marginally strengthening the current 
pact is that if European authorities increase their intervention in national public finances 
this will create a perception among member states that they have the right to receive 
financial assistance if their public finances go wrong. The result will be more moral 
hazard. This suggests that mid-way solutions are likely to fail. 
 
Therefore, if fiscal rules are to be sound they must be flexible, but flexibility will make 
them easy to manipulate and therefore hard to enforce. If, on the other hand, they are to 
be easily enforceable and automatic they are also likely to be ‘stupid’ like the initial SGP. 
This suggests a need for a completely new approach. 
 
The alternative to fiscal rules that has been proposed by several authors3 and endorsed 
by the ECB in at least one of its proposals4 is fiscal committees. These institutions would 
produce independent, technically-based appraisals of fiscal policy. They would enjoy 
more flexibility but their independence would avoid the moral hazard problem. Instead of 
forcing governments to run deficits and surpluses according to an inflexible rule, an 
independent institution could evaluate the margin of manoeuvre of the government in 
each period in view of the medium-term goal of fiscal sustainability. Since, on the one 
hand, the goal of debt sustainability is not controversial and can be evaluated on technical 
grounds and, on the other, both the composition and size of taxes and expenditures could 
be set freely, the argument goes, there would be no real problem of political legitimacy. 
The analogy with central banks is clear: an independent agency, with an uncontroversial 
mandate (price stability or fiscal sustainability) whose action can be evaluated on 
technical grounds. 
 
                                                 
2 Jürgen von Hagen (2010), ‘The Sustainability of Public Finances and Fiscal Policy Coordination in the EMU’, 
policy paper nr 412/2010, Case Network Studies and Analyses. 
3 There is an ample literature on fiscal councils. See the essays by Fatás & Mihov, Ubide, Lane and Wyplosz 
in Richard Baldwin, Daniel Gros and Luc Laeven (Eds.) (2010), Completing the Eurozone Rescue: What More 
Needs to be Done, VOX, or the many contributions by Wyplosz, such as Charles Wyplosz (2008), ‘Fiscal 
Policy Councils: Unlovable or Just Unloved’, Swedish Economic Policy Review, nr 15. 
4 ECB (2010), ‘Reinforcing Economic Governance in the Euro Area’, Brussels, 10/VI/2010. 
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The details of this approach diverge from one proposal to another depending on the role 
of fiscal councils in the budgetary procedure. In some, fiscal councils would only have 
‘soft power’ and the government would just consult them. Fiscal councils would have the 
same role of the European Commission now. In the case of the EMU, our preferred 
design could arguably be as follows. In order to solve the enforcement puzzle, fiscal 
councils would be given the monopoly of issuing public debt –just as central banks have 
the monopoly of issuing money–. Their structure, governance and composition would be 
analogous to that of the ECB. It would have a federal structure, composed of a 
‘eurosystem’ of national fiscal councils that would individually be governed according to 
some commonly set criteria of independence. This would allow a common coordinated 
fiscal policy, set according to technocratic criteria –just as monetary policy is–. Finally, the 
proposal could embody many of the suggestions for the creation of ‘Eurobonds’, for which 
all member states would be collectively responsible. 
 
This sort of arrangement would fit well with another institution that could be considered 
necessary in view of the recent crisis: a permanent sovereign default mechanism. Such a 
mechanism was not envisioned by the treaties since the possibility of default was 
considered remote and the prevention framework sufficient. It has become apparent, 
however, that the Eurozone would have benefited from an insurance scheme instead of 
deciding as the financial turmoil developed. One proposal was initially made by Thomas 
Mayer & Daniel Gros,5 who suggested the creation of a European Monetary Fund that 
would fulfil the role of lender of last resort and enforcer of fiscal discipline –just like the 
IMF at the international scale–. This arrangement would act as an insurer but prevent 
moral hazard by linking discipline and prevention to subsequent help. In our design, this 
EMF could be managed by the European fiscal council since it would act as an 
intermediary between debt-holders and member states. 
 
In fact, the crisis has led to the creation of two lending facilities: the European Financial 
Stability Mechanism (EFSM), managed by the European Commission, and a more 
substantial but temporary one (that can set up new programmes only until the end of June 
2013), the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), managed by member states. The 
declared purpose of these institutions is to provide liquidity to member states with financial 
difficulties in a context of market distress. Most commentators have, however, suggested 
that the principle is flawed since countries such as Greece and Ireland do not face liquidity 
but solvency problems. The fund has turned into a de facto substitute for what Gros & 
Mayer proposed: a mechanism that helps to reschedule debt and lending at low rates –
something which is economically equivalent to partly defaulting or receiving some sort of 
fiscal transfer–. The fact that the aim the EFSM is supposed to fulfil is unclear has blurred 
the debate on its evaluation. However, most commentators6 think that the fund is likely to 
be too small. Although it was recently increased, the official diagnosis remains that the 
problem is one of liquidity, that no default is likely to take place and that most countries 
are likely to repay their debts, something that most commentators find distressing.7
 
All in all, despite the efforts of European leaders, there are reasons to be pessimistic 
about the current governance framework. The experience of the last decades gives 
reason to think that fiscal governance based on politically-enforced rules is likely to fail or 
                                                 
5 Thomas Mayer & Daniel Gross (2010), ‘Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund’, Policy Brief nr 202, Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, February. 
6 See, eg, Willem H. Buiter, Ebrahim Rahbari, Jürgen Michels & Giada Giani (2011), ‘The Debt of Nations’, 
Citigroup Report, January. 
7 Daniel Gros (2011), ‘Pact for the Euro: Tough Talk, Soft Conditions?’, VOX, 14/III/2011. 
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bring about division and political tension. Moreover, the current bankruptcy mechanism 
raises multiple doubts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What Would a Proper Solution Look Like? 
It has been shown that a solution should include an agreement on both fiscal policy and 
competitiveness. The current approach to fiscal governance is flawed as it lacks any 
credible enforcement mechanism and fiscal discipline is likely to be relaxed as soon as 
growth is resumed. There are still two issues to be dealt with: the problem of current 
account imbalances and that of political feasibility. 
 
Some critics8 have suggested that the emphasis on public indiscipline is misplaced since 
fiscal turmoil can be mainly attributed to the effect of the financial crisis. This is a serious 
criticism: issues of excessive private indebtedness and competitiveness are at the core of 
the current crisis. However, the analysis tends to neglect the fact that proper 
countercyclical fiscal policy could be used to reduce current account imbalances, as was 
recently suggested by Jean Claude Trichet.9 In fact, the proper management of fiscal 
policy should be prudent enough and take into account the risk of a crisis causing fiscal 
distress by building the appropriate buffer. Therefore, while this critique attenuates the 
guilt of fiscal misbehaviour in the crisis, it hardly weakens the case for a revision of the 
EMU’s fiscal framework. 
 
How hard would such an agreement be to implement? Implementing a proper fiscal 
architecture, like the one proposed in this paper, would require a treaty revision which 
would need a long process of ratification. Moreover, fiscal policy is not considered a 
technical issue and delegating debt policy to an independent agency could be seen as an 
enormous renunciation of sovereignty which is likely to encounter resistance. On the other 
hand, there are several reasons to be optimistic. While countries are very reluctant to give 
up their sovereignty on fiscal issues, it is a fact that the current Stability and Growth Pact, 
if properly implemented, already implies a substantial renunciation of fiscal sovereignty. A 
fiscal council would only mean a credible commitment to a goal that is already considered 
to be desirable. The agreement could be part of a grand bargain to solve the whole 
crisis.10
 
Luis Guirola 
Bank of Spain 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Paul De Grauwe (2010), ‘Fighting the Wrong Enemy’, VoxEU.org, 19/V/2010. 
9 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/sp110216.en.html. 
10 Daniel Gros (2010), ‘All Together Now? Arguments for a Big Bang Solution to Eurozone Problems’, Centre 
for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, 6/XII/CEPS. 
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